Paradise Divided: Sri Lanka’s War for Peace in a Global Arena
Note: Submitted as an assignment for Course in Political and Social Chnage in South Asia, October 2005
Compared to its promising socio-economic performance at the time of independence, the present circumstances of Sri Lanka, with its protracted war that has cost 168% of the country’s GDP in 1996, falls nothing short of the Miltonic idiom of paradise lost. Figures for loss of human lives range from 60, 000 to 70,000 since the civil war broke out in 1983, of which about 30, 000 are considered to be civilians (Brass & Vanaik: 198, Orjuela, 2004:17). Uyangoda points out that in terms of sheer magnitude Sri Lanka’s civil conflict is presently the most intense internal war in the entire world, while Varshney recognizes it as an ethnic clash based on ascriptive group identities which, irrespective of internal class differentiation, sect or religion, tend to define the politics of an ethnic group (World Politics, April 2001: 364).
A postcolonial analysis helps to understand the development of two nationalisms within one state. According to Orjuela, the postcolonial democratic system reinforced the identity politics introduced during the British rule. In the two decades ensuing independence the new social forces attempted to define a national identity in opposition to the Western ethos as a reaction to the English educated political elites that were seen as an alien by-product of the colonial system as well as the colonial experience itself. One aspect of decolonisation was seen as a renewal of country’s religio-cultural traditions. This ‘Sinhalesation’ of the state essentially prompted minority Tamil nationalism. The Sinahala nationalist ideology holds that territorial integrity and prevalence of the majority rule as necessary to preserve the Sinhala Buddhist identity where as the Tamil nationalist ideology claims the Tamil nation’s right to self determination in what it defines as the Tamil homeland in the North and East of the island. These two competing nationalisms led to bipolarisation of the ethnic groups in which essentialism and stereotypes continue to breed deep distrust of ‘the other’. A quintessential quote comes from the former President Kumaratunga who in an interview with a French daily, Le Point in 2000 claimed that Prabhakaran “has the mentality of an Adolf Hitler. He is a megalomaniac. He finds much pleasure in killing and destroying…what the LTTE want is to torpedo negotiations” (Asian Survey, January 2001:118).
The formation of Tamil identity in terms of suffering and struggle is central to Tamil nationalism. This includes a multitude of painful experiences relating to discrimination and marginalisation due to language policy, university admission system, unfair economic development and political system favouring majority rule. Furthermore, discrimination in the labour market, Sinhalese-biased education system in subjects of history and social sciences and the lack of recognition for Tamil identity incite a feeling of second-class citizenry. The LTTE has glorified the courageous Tamil struggling against suppression. Orjuela points out that LTTE fosters a culture of heroism and devotion of war martyrs with religious features inspired by both Hinduism and Christianity.
In an age where globalisation simultaneously weakens the power of nation state and gives rise to identity quests (Kinnvall and Jönsson, 2002: 12), the ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka inevitably lead to insecurity. Sinhalese supremacy is seen as a threat to Tamil identity, Tamil separatism is conceived to be a threat to Sri Lankan national integrity - a viscous circle of postcolonial insecurities. The development of a war economy can be viewed in a similar context where the armed forces seems to be the steady avenue of public sector employment for both Tamil and Sinhalese, urban and rural proletariat. A stable monthly income with allowances for serving in battle areas and guaranteed pension to the families in case of death has made ‘employment’ in the armed forces an attractive life proposition for vernacular-schooled rural young men with secondary level education (Uyangoda: 202) He further mentions Nordstrom’s concept of ‘dirty war’ that subjects people to violence ‘not simply to win a political victory but to crush any perceived or imagined threat’ and thereby destroy cultures of co-existence.
The LTTE has a global network for political lobbying and fundraising for social rehabilitation as well as trading in drugs, weapons and other items for war efforts. About 60% of the LTTE’s war budget is generated through Tamil Diaspora and trade in North America, Europe, Southeast Asia and the Far East (Gunaratne 1999 quoted in Orjuela 2004: 98). On the other hand the LTTE has sought legitimacy and support by playing on ‘struggle for liberation’, to foster ties with more formal global economy of international humanitarian assistance.
However, globalisation has other imperatives such as the internationalisation of Sri Lanka’s conflict where global powers are likely to play a direct role in coercing both the government and the LTTE to find peace. According to Uyangoda this means that the country’s ethnic conflict now unfolds in a global arena where international community has begun to define the options available for both parties, by conceptualising mediating and even imposing a framework for negotiations. With the global war on terror giving rise to anti-separatist ethos, a consensus has emerged among main political powers such as EU, USA, India and the UN that in the current conjuncture of South Asian politics, they are not in favour of creating a new ethnic state in Sri Lanka. Though the Indian intervention of 1987 miserably failed the present involvement of Norway as mediator and Japan as a major donor has played crucial role in deciding the future trajectory of the peace process. Writing in 2001, Uyangoda points out that with the political conditions then existing in Sri Lanka, the logic of externally mediated settlement may not necessarily contribute to long term peace, as the domestic constituencies did not match these external forces.
The recent presidential election saw Mahinda Rajapakse to power backed by JVP and Sihala Urumaya – two Sinhalese nationalist parties. Rajapakse is in support of renegotiation of the ceasefire agreement of 2002. With the recent assassination of a foreign minister (who happened to be a Tamil instrumental in banning LTTE as a terrorist organisation internationally) still fresh in the communal memory, it remains to be seen what externally induced negotiation process could succeed in bringing peace to this deeply divided society.
Bibliography
Sri Lanka in 2000: Politics of Despair, Lawrence Saez, Asian Survey, Vol XLI No 1 January/February 2001
Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society, Ashutosh Varshney, World Politics, Vol 53, No 3 April, 2001
Globalization and Democratization in Asia, Catrina Kinnvall & Kristina Jönsson, 2002
Competing Nationalisms in South Asia, Paul R Brass & Achin Vaniak
Civil Society in Civil War: Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka, Camilla Orjuela, 2004
Ethical Dilemmas of Development in Asia, Godfrey Gunatilleke, Neelan Tiruchelvam & Radhika Coomaraswamy, 1983
Hasini Apsara Haputhanthri
MA in Asian Studies
Centre for East and Southeast Asian Sudies
Lund Unversity
Sweden
Compared to its promising socio-economic performance at the time of independence, the present circumstances of Sri Lanka, with its protracted war that has cost 168% of the country’s GDP in 1996, falls nothing short of the Miltonic idiom of paradise lost. Figures for loss of human lives range from 60, 000 to 70,000 since the civil war broke out in 1983, of which about 30, 000 are considered to be civilians (Brass & Vanaik: 198, Orjuela, 2004:17). Uyangoda points out that in terms of sheer magnitude Sri Lanka’s civil conflict is presently the most intense internal war in the entire world, while Varshney recognizes it as an ethnic clash based on ascriptive group identities which, irrespective of internal class differentiation, sect or religion, tend to define the politics of an ethnic group (World Politics, April 2001: 364).
A postcolonial analysis helps to understand the development of two nationalisms within one state. According to Orjuela, the postcolonial democratic system reinforced the identity politics introduced during the British rule. In the two decades ensuing independence the new social forces attempted to define a national identity in opposition to the Western ethos as a reaction to the English educated political elites that were seen as an alien by-product of the colonial system as well as the colonial experience itself. One aspect of decolonisation was seen as a renewal of country’s religio-cultural traditions. This ‘Sinhalesation’ of the state essentially prompted minority Tamil nationalism. The Sinahala nationalist ideology holds that territorial integrity and prevalence of the majority rule as necessary to preserve the Sinhala Buddhist identity where as the Tamil nationalist ideology claims the Tamil nation’s right to self determination in what it defines as the Tamil homeland in the North and East of the island. These two competing nationalisms led to bipolarisation of the ethnic groups in which essentialism and stereotypes continue to breed deep distrust of ‘the other’. A quintessential quote comes from the former President Kumaratunga who in an interview with a French daily, Le Point in 2000 claimed that Prabhakaran “has the mentality of an Adolf Hitler. He is a megalomaniac. He finds much pleasure in killing and destroying…what the LTTE want is to torpedo negotiations” (Asian Survey, January 2001:118).
The formation of Tamil identity in terms of suffering and struggle is central to Tamil nationalism. This includes a multitude of painful experiences relating to discrimination and marginalisation due to language policy, university admission system, unfair economic development and political system favouring majority rule. Furthermore, discrimination in the labour market, Sinhalese-biased education system in subjects of history and social sciences and the lack of recognition for Tamil identity incite a feeling of second-class citizenry. The LTTE has glorified the courageous Tamil struggling against suppression. Orjuela points out that LTTE fosters a culture of heroism and devotion of war martyrs with religious features inspired by both Hinduism and Christianity.
In an age where globalisation simultaneously weakens the power of nation state and gives rise to identity quests (Kinnvall and Jönsson, 2002: 12), the ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka inevitably lead to insecurity. Sinhalese supremacy is seen as a threat to Tamil identity, Tamil separatism is conceived to be a threat to Sri Lankan national integrity - a viscous circle of postcolonial insecurities. The development of a war economy can be viewed in a similar context where the armed forces seems to be the steady avenue of public sector employment for both Tamil and Sinhalese, urban and rural proletariat. A stable monthly income with allowances for serving in battle areas and guaranteed pension to the families in case of death has made ‘employment’ in the armed forces an attractive life proposition for vernacular-schooled rural young men with secondary level education (Uyangoda: 202) He further mentions Nordstrom’s concept of ‘dirty war’ that subjects people to violence ‘not simply to win a political victory but to crush any perceived or imagined threat’ and thereby destroy cultures of co-existence.
The LTTE has a global network for political lobbying and fundraising for social rehabilitation as well as trading in drugs, weapons and other items for war efforts. About 60% of the LTTE’s war budget is generated through Tamil Diaspora and trade in North America, Europe, Southeast Asia and the Far East (Gunaratne 1999 quoted in Orjuela 2004: 98). On the other hand the LTTE has sought legitimacy and support by playing on ‘struggle for liberation’, to foster ties with more formal global economy of international humanitarian assistance.
However, globalisation has other imperatives such as the internationalisation of Sri Lanka’s conflict where global powers are likely to play a direct role in coercing both the government and the LTTE to find peace. According to Uyangoda this means that the country’s ethnic conflict now unfolds in a global arena where international community has begun to define the options available for both parties, by conceptualising mediating and even imposing a framework for negotiations. With the global war on terror giving rise to anti-separatist ethos, a consensus has emerged among main political powers such as EU, USA, India and the UN that in the current conjuncture of South Asian politics, they are not in favour of creating a new ethnic state in Sri Lanka. Though the Indian intervention of 1987 miserably failed the present involvement of Norway as mediator and Japan as a major donor has played crucial role in deciding the future trajectory of the peace process. Writing in 2001, Uyangoda points out that with the political conditions then existing in Sri Lanka, the logic of externally mediated settlement may not necessarily contribute to long term peace, as the domestic constituencies did not match these external forces.
The recent presidential election saw Mahinda Rajapakse to power backed by JVP and Sihala Urumaya – two Sinhalese nationalist parties. Rajapakse is in support of renegotiation of the ceasefire agreement of 2002. With the recent assassination of a foreign minister (who happened to be a Tamil instrumental in banning LTTE as a terrorist organisation internationally) still fresh in the communal memory, it remains to be seen what externally induced negotiation process could succeed in bringing peace to this deeply divided society.
Bibliography
Sri Lanka in 2000: Politics of Despair, Lawrence Saez, Asian Survey, Vol XLI No 1 January/February 2001
Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society, Ashutosh Varshney, World Politics, Vol 53, No 3 April, 2001
Globalization and Democratization in Asia, Catrina Kinnvall & Kristina Jönsson, 2002
Competing Nationalisms in South Asia, Paul R Brass & Achin Vaniak
Civil Society in Civil War: Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka, Camilla Orjuela, 2004
Ethical Dilemmas of Development in Asia, Godfrey Gunatilleke, Neelan Tiruchelvam & Radhika Coomaraswamy, 1983
Hasini Apsara Haputhanthri
MA in Asian Studies
Centre for East and Southeast Asian Sudies
Lund Unversity
Sweden
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