Guns and Robes:Militant Monks in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic and Political Conflict
Note: Submitted as an assignment for Region-specific Course in South Asia
Caught in the throes of recent violence heralding a return to total war Sri Lankan society seems to be tipping dangerously towards increased militancy and civil unrest. Since the civil war broke out in 1983, official (and rather outdated) figures for loss of human lives range from 60, 000 to 70,000 of which about 30, 000 are considered to be civilians. Uyangoda points out that in terms of sheer magnitude Sri Lanka’s civil conflict is presently the most intense internal war in the entire world. This contains a paradox to the deeply engrained traditions of Buddhism in the island that seem to connect its past and present. While Varshney recognizes the present conflict as an ethnic clash based on ascriptive group identities that define the politics of an ethnic group irrespective of internal class differentiation, sect or religion, much Western scholarship on the issue has referred to it as an ethnic and religious conflict. In a forward to the acclaimed work ‘Buddhism Betrayed: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka’ Jayawardena points out that ‘the reasons [to the ethnic and religious conflict] are embedded in history, the political process and the ideology of religion and nationalism’. This essay tries to explore the discourse on how Buddhism as a collective and a public religion has contributed to the ethnic conflict from a historical perspective, especially with regard to the emergence of ‘Militant Buddhism’. The author has made an effort to go beyond the image of the militant monk found in much-quoted scholarly work on the subject to discover the more recent phenomenon of Buddhist monks in electoral politics.
Before turning to Buddhism, a more general view of the background to the ethnic rift should be spelt out, since the author believes that ignoring the context in general leads to placing overemphasis on certain issues. Orjuela claims that ‘[a] conflict over power and resources has resulted in a deep social divide, [where] ethno-mobilisation plays a central role and civilians are increasingly the perpetrators and the victims of violence’. Thus it must be stressed that power and resources and not religion lies at the roots of the conflict. She argues that the postcolonial democratic system reinforced the identity politics introduced during the British rule, leading to the development of two nationalisms within one state. De Silva contends that the model of parliamentary democracy – too simplistic for a population of ethnic diversity - concentrated power in the hands of a postcolonial elite who perpetuated the colonial stratagem of divide and rule to gain advantage of electoral politics. The author attributes the rise of mass nationalism among the Sinhalese as a reaction, not only towards the British, but towards this English educated power-elite that continued hegemonic tendencies into post independence era as well. One aspect of decolonisation was seen as a renewal of country’s religio-cultural traditions. A second aspect of decolonisation involved the relative positions and the sharing of power among the various ethnic groups. The major political parties played upon both these aspects to mobilize mass support and the demands of Sinhala Buddhist majority became the dominant cultural identity. This ‘Sinhalesation’ of the state essentially prompted minority Tamil nationalism. The Sinhala nationalist ideology holds that territorial integrity and prevalence of the majority rule as necessary to preserve the Sinhala Buddhist identity where as the Tamil nationalist ideology claims the Tamil nation’s right to self determination in what it defines as the Tamil homeland in the North and East of the island.
History and Religious Ideology
The 2500 years of Buddhist civilisation recounted in Pali chronicles are constantly reinterpreted and reinvented in postcolonial nationalist discourse. Amunugama writes that according to Sinhala-Buddhist tradition, fashioned largely by Vamsa literature, Sri Lanka is the Dharmadvipa (the island of faith), consecrated by the Buddha himself as the land in which his teachings would flourish. The myth of origin in Mahavamsa, a 6th century chronicle written by Buddhist monk-scholar, states that on the very day of the Buddha’s death, Vijaya-the founder of the Sinhala race - landed in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it was believed that the Buddha had visited the island thrice. One of those visits was to Nagadipa in the northernmost part of the Jaffna peninsula. (Ironically, to establish concord between two quarrelling kinsmen.) The north was thereby firmly established within the sacred geography of Buddhists. Till the beginning of the ethnic war Nagadipa was an important pilgrimage center for Sinhala Buddhists on a par with Mahiyangana and Kelaniya.
Rogers argues that during the Kandyan era being Buddhist was more important in claiming the throne than being Sinhalese. All Kandyan kings were expected to fulfil the role of the Buddhist king, but the longevity of the Nayakkar dynasty indicates no requirement of being Sinhalese. An important strain of royal ideology, which dates back to at least first century AD, posited a strong relationship between the king and Theravada Buddhism, especially the monkhood. According to Kapferer the defeat of the Kandyan Kingdom in 1815 ended the ruling chapters of Asgiri and Malwatta Buddhist monkhood, severing the connection between the Sangha and the state. The Buddhist revitalisation movements were integral to the reinvention of Sinhala Buddhist culture during the independence struggle. Kapferer argues that this revivalism tried to re-establish the old status quo of the affiliation of Buddhism to state. Though it had place for minorities, the Buddhist idea of co-existence, according to Kapferer, was by placing the minorities of the island in a subordinate role:
In Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist cosmology the nation and the state compose a unity. In cosmological conception the state protectively encloses the nation of Sinhalese Buddhists, whose integrity as persons is dependent on this encompassment. The state in such a conception encloses other peoples or nations who are not Sinhalese Buddhists. But critical here is that these peoples are maintained in hierarchical subordination to Sinhalese Buddhists. The encompassing and ordering power of the state is hierarchical, and the integrity of nations, peoples, and persons within the Sinhalese Buddhist state is dependent on the capacity of the state to maintain by the exercise of its power the hierarchical interrelation of all those it encloses. The failure in the power of the Sinhalese Buddhist state to maintain hierarchy in the whole order circumscribes threatens the integrity of persons. Thus the fragmentation of the state is also the fragmentation of the nation and is also the fragmentation of the person (Kapferer, 1988:7).
Buddhist Revivalism and Monastic Involvement in Politics
Tambiah claims that the Buddhist revivalism was a reaction against the betrayal of Buddhism during the British Raj and the restoration of Buddhism became an integral part of national freedom. Further, he argues that Buddhist-nationalist journalism propagated by key figures involved in the Buddhist revival like Anagarika Dharmapala fuelled communalism, culminating in the anti Muslim riot of 1915. Thus, what started off as a reaction against Christianity, Western habits of eating meat and alcoholism during the late 19th century was transformed into an ideology that alienated the minorities of the island during the 20th century.
In the struggle for Independence the role of the Buddhist monk as political and social activist was brought to attention, especially with the publication of Walapola Rahula’s The Heritage of the Bikkhu in 1946. Tambiah explains how during the very first general election in 1947 a group of radical monks became politically active in support of the leftist parties. He attributes the narrowing of Sri Lankan politics to a limited range of issues ‘framed within the confines of a Sinhala Buddhist nationalism’ to the emergence of these ‘militant monks’, during the early years of nation-building and state formation. However, he admits that monks were not involved in the riots of 1983, or in the events that preceded it. Nevertheless, he argues that proliferating ‘militantly Buddhist organisations’ during 1980s with a focus on the Sinhala Tamil ethnic conflict such as Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV), were instrumental in swaying public opinion against the ‘dangers of devolutionary solutions’ to the conflict, which was interpreted as the first step towards a Tamil Eelam.
Amunugama argues that the decision of Tamil youth to take to violence in their struggle for a separate state, the induction of Indian troops to the island, and the decision of the JVP to use ‘revolutionary violence’ created dilemmas-of varying degree-for Sinhala monks. With the exception of a minority of monks living in borderland of war or working with peace movements the majority of monks supported the Sri Lankan army curbing the Tamil rebels, seeking legitimacy through the distinction between violent Tamil guerillas and nonviolent Tamil civilians. According to Amunugama the Buddhist monks were encouraged to support the violence against Tamil rebels for the very fact that they were direct targets of rebel attacks. The rebels singled out monks for punishment: temples in North and East were attacked and busload of monks were massacred in Arantalawa in the late 1980s. 100 worshippers at the sacred Bo tree in Anuradhapura were killed and the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Kandy was attacked. The characterization of the Tamil rebels as savage helped the monastic order to support and extend their patronage to the Sri Lankan military forces. Amunugama writes:
Military commanders, after assuming office, worshipped at the Temple of the Tooth and met the Mahanayakes of Asgiriya and Malwatta to obtain their blessings. Bodhi Pujas were held in leading temples to seek the blessings of gods in ensuring the safety and success of military personnel. Monks officiated at military functions and the central army cantonment at Panagoda saw the erection of an impressive ‘chaitya’ (pagoda). (Amunugama 1991: 129)
Indo-Lanka Peace Accord
According to the Indo Lanka agreement in 1987 the Sri Lankan authorities agreed to effect changes in the country’s constitution and devolve substantial power from the center to the provinces. Eight Provincial Councils were to be established; one of which - the council of the amalgamated North and Eastern provinces - would be Tamil dominated. This would, in effect grant a degree of autonomy- to the Tamils in what they claimed were their ‘traditional homelands’. On this note, India deployed its army, said to be around 55,000 in strength to pacify the Northern reaches of the island, and in turn released the Sri Lankan army sent to confront the JVP struggle in the South. The devolutionary solution was strongly opposed by the JVP and young monks. An agreement between the two governments in an exchange of letters that neither the port of Trincomalee nor any other part of the island will be made “available for military use by any other country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests” confirmed fears of Indian imperialism among Sri Lankans and created an unprecedented uproar.
Amunugama and Tambiah both claim that religious ideologues such as Maduluwawe Sobhitha have played a pivotal role in resisting IPKF involvement in the conflict, by influencing public opinion. This was not unconnected to the young monks’ involvement with the JVP and its armed struggle. In fact, the 1980s saw the rapid politicization of the Sangha with all Sinhala political parties establishing support organizations among the Sangha. The extreme of this logic was that JVP recruited the monks as another foot soldier in its struggle. This brought the Buddhist order face to face with violence. The most illustrative example of this phenomenon comes from May Day Parade in 1982 when a thousand young monks ‘clad in their distinctive saffron red robes walked under the banner of the socialist Bhikku front.
JVP’s Warrior-Monk
Tambiah questions: how did the ‘sons of Buddha – ideally dedicated to nonviolence and required by disciplinary rules to abstain from killing and to be nowhere near marching armies and traffic in arms – have taken on the more compelling identity of the ‘sons of the soil’, which entails militant and violent politics? An answer can be found in the JVP movement of the 1970s and 80, which was the most systematic and successful in mobilizing monks as an essential militant support group. Drawing its membership from young rural proletariat, educated yet unemployed due to Sri Lanka’s benign social policies and poor economic growth, the movement infiltrated universities, where young monks constituted an increasingly significant segment. The egalitarian populist ideology, spiced with anti-Tamil pro-Sinhala and pseudo-Buddhist elements appealed to these young monks, who have been fighting hierarchy, sectarianism and casteism within their own monastic orders vis-à-vis national revival for the past half-century. Drawing from A.C. Alles, Tambiah and Amunugama mention that the decision to launch the attack on government in 1971 was taken in a Bhikku hostel in a university and that during both 1971 and 1987 rebellions some Buddhist temples in rural areas were used as storages for arms and ammunition, hiding places and outposts by the insurgents. Amunugama claims that during the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord the polarization of JVP and other mainstream parties into two camps was reflected in the monastic order with senior monks favoring the pro-accord stance of the main political parties, resulting in the assassination of these monks, allegedly by the JVP. The brutal repression of the insurgency made the JVP monks the most vulnerable segment of the movement, unable to hide underground following its militant leaders. Though the author has not located actual data, it is common knowledge that many young monks were tortured and killed by paramilitary forces. Amunugama explains how poetry corners and short story pages in newspapers were filled up with this dilemma of the young monks, who on the face of state terror had to change loyalties, flee the country or as in the finale of many stories, shed the saffron robe and take to a T-56 submachine gun, and disappear into the night.
JHU’s Politician Monk
Much has changed since Tambiah’s controversial book and Amunugama’s poignant essay published in early 1990s. In 2004, nine Buddhist monks were elected to the parliament, creating history in Theravada Buddhist Monasticism in South and South East Asia. Jatika Hela Urumaya was the first such monastic political party to take part in electoral politics with over 200 Buddhist monk candidates standing for the parliamentary elections of in April 2004. Though the event caused much debate among the lay public JHU were able to secure 5.9% of the total votes polled. Deegalle attributes this quick victory to JHU’s roots to Sihala Urumaya, another nationalist political party suffering an electoral setback, and the general socio-religious context of the country. JHU was able to capitalize on the untimely death of Gangodavila Soma, a charismatic popular monk who had immense influence on public opinion. Sri Lankan newspapers characterize Soma as ‘quite identical’ to the early twentieth-century Buddhist reformer, Anagarika Dharmapala,. Through the use of mass media such as television talk shows a number of monks were criticizing state corruption and issues of ethnic conflict, through the Buddhist rhetoric of ‘Dharmaraajya’ (a righteous state).
The JHU manifesto claims Buddhist supremacy and upholds the preservation of Buddhism and sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka as the priority of the state. They have been active in passing a bill for banning forceful conversion of Hindus and Buddhists into Christianity. JHU has been widely criticized not only by international organizations but by local media as well for Sinhalese Chauvinism, which proves that JHU Sinhala Buddhist nationalism is a small yet forceful minority political opinion. Top prelates and sections of the media have objected to the monks being directly involved in politics. A Sunday Times editorial, for instance, meekly commented: “The Kings of Lanka would constantly seek the advice of the monks in order that they guide the destinies of their people righteously: And that is the way that ought to be today. Nowhere is it said that a monk should be the king himself.” Interestingly this comment highlights that the lay Buddhists acknowledge the role of the monk as guide though it condemns active participation of monks in politics.
These recent developments show that despite the infamous involvement with the JVP during the previous two decades, the Buddhist monks have become a political group wielding public opinion. In return for JHU backing, President Rajapakse agreed to JHU demands during his presidential election campaign for a more aggressive stance against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The 12-point agreement included the revision of the current government-LTTE ceasefire; the abrogation of a government-LTTE agreement for the joint administration of tsunami aid; and the rejection of federalism as the basis for a peace deal with the LTTE.
Guns and Robes
An essay ‘Non-violent Buddhist Problem Solving in Sri Lanka’ by A T Ariyaratna, founder of the Sarvodaya movement, describes the predicament of the Buddhist laity in grasping the paradox of violence in a country idolising the Buddhist values of Ahimsa, and especially among the monastic order:
Statistically seventy percent of the people in Sri Lanka are said to profess Buddhism. There is hardly any place in the country where an ancient or modern Buddhist monument or monastery in not found. There are around twenty thousand monks attending to the religious needs of people today. Religious ceremonies and related activities are going on continuously. The teachings of the Buddha in its most pristine form is found in Dhamma texts. Even non- Buddhist laymen and politicians liberally quote chapter and verse from the Buddha's Words in their public utterances. When one sees and hears this, one gets the impression, or I would say, the illusion, that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country. To my mind, to call Sri Lanka a Buddhist country and then to put the blame for every kind of immoral act or incident of violence or denial of human rights on Buddhists is not fair. Even though historically and culturally Sri Lanka may claim to be Buddhist, in my opinion, certainly the way political and economic structures are instituted and managed today can hardly be called Buddhist either in precept or practice. (Ariyaratne 2006, unpublished/ personal communication)
Similarly as a Sri Lankan, the author often found it difficult to relate some of parts the scholastic writings to the public realities experienced. Terms like ‘Militant Buddhism’ have been used carelessly by the media, and more obvious common-sense answers lost in esoteric academic debate. Tambiah, one of the main sources quoted in this essay, often draws from other sources openly propagandist in nature. Ariyratne on the same note:
…a negative kind of intervention on the part of some educated people, interventions in the form of scholarly analyses based on a hoard of statistical data and historical facts. I call this mostly negative intervention because they did not affect in any way the thinking of either the man on the street or our basic political and economic structure that promoted the situation of disharmony and conflict. In other words, philosophising that does not touch the basic roots of mental defilements and social realities resulting from them, in Buddhist terminology, is simply called moha or ignorance. When ignorance becomes organised, and one calls it social science, it is a disaster for communities who have a right to expect more positive interventions from the more educated sectors. We see a situation today in Sri Lanka of different groups holding onto their own uncompromising positions while the sound of guns and explosions continue to be heard. (Ariyaratne 2006, unpublished/ personal communication)
Conclusion
An attempt was made to illustrate briefly the matrix of history religion and ethno-politics in Sri Lanka’s decades-long conflict with special focus on the role played by Buddhist monks. As a majority with a minority complex derived, (as claimed by many scholarly anthropologists), from centuries of paranoia of Indian invasions and conspiracy theories from which the island - as the last resort of Buddhism - has to be saved, one could readily simplify the case of Sri Lanka as religious fundamentalism. However, the politicisation and militancy of the monks is but one thread that contributes to weave a complex social fabric of conflict and chaos. Failure to provide economic and political opportunities to educated alienated youth (both Sinhala and Tamil) resulting in social frustration is perhaps more fundamental to JVP and LTTE militant struggles than the ‘burden of historical memories’ of ancient kingdoms. Furthermore, it is essential to understand the militant monk as a part of a society completely wreaked by power struggles resorting to violence in all sides – LTTE in the north, JVP in the south the state in countering and repressing these struggles and the induction of the Indian troops within the island, to top it all. The young monks had had to react and find justifications for prioritising the task of saving the motherland over passive preaching of Dharma.
As Amunugama argues, it is also difficult to view the monastic order as a monolithic organisation that had clear-cut vision on ethnic and political issues.
Most importantly he points out the attempts of Sinhala monks to understand social reality in terms of Buddhist symbolism. When dealing with secular notions like ethnicity, democracy, revolution and violence, monks attempted to relate them to their culturally prescribed world of symbols. They go back to the examples of the monks who confronted British power during the struggle for independence. Communism is understood in terms of the Buddha’s prescription of communal living (absence of private property, sharing of alms, etc.) for the monastic order. This leads to the continuous ‘oversimplification’ of complex contemporary issues.
As a final note, the exploration of this discourse may lead one to question the absence of a dialogue on secularism in Sri Lanka, which was present in India in its nationalist discourse.
Bibliography
Ariyaratna, A T, (2006) Non-violent Buddhist Problem Solving in Sri Lanka, unpublished/ personal communication
Deegalle Mahinda (2004) Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and Ethnicity in Contemporary Sri Lanka, Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 5, No. 2
De Silva, Purnaka L (1997) Sri Lanka: Futures beyond Conlict, Futures vol29 issue 10
Dias Wije, 2005, Sri Lanka: the JHU-Rajapakse deal and the reactionary role of Buddhist Supremacism, World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org
Kapferer, Bruce (2001), Ethnic Nationalism and Discourses on violence in Sri Lanka, Communal/Plural Vol 9 no 1
Orjuela, Camilla (2004) Civil Society in Civil War: Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka, PhD Dissertation, Göteborg University
Panini Wijesiriwardana and K. Ratnayake 1, April, 2004: New Sinhala extremist party fields Buddhist monks in Sri Lankan elections, World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org
Rogers, John D (1994), Post Orientalism and Interpretation of Pre-modern and Modern Political Identities, Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 53, No 1, Pages 10-23, Association of Asian Studies
Tambiah, Stanley J (1992), Buddhism Betrayed: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka, University of Chicago Press
Uyangoda J Brass, Paul R & Vanaik, Achin Competing Nationalisms in South Asia
Hasini Apsara Haputhanthri
MA in Asian Studies
Centre for East and Southeast Asian Sudies
Lund Unversity
Sweden
Caught in the throes of recent violence heralding a return to total war Sri Lankan society seems to be tipping dangerously towards increased militancy and civil unrest. Since the civil war broke out in 1983, official (and rather outdated) figures for loss of human lives range from 60, 000 to 70,000 of which about 30, 000 are considered to be civilians. Uyangoda points out that in terms of sheer magnitude Sri Lanka’s civil conflict is presently the most intense internal war in the entire world. This contains a paradox to the deeply engrained traditions of Buddhism in the island that seem to connect its past and present. While Varshney recognizes the present conflict as an ethnic clash based on ascriptive group identities that define the politics of an ethnic group irrespective of internal class differentiation, sect or religion, much Western scholarship on the issue has referred to it as an ethnic and religious conflict. In a forward to the acclaimed work ‘Buddhism Betrayed: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka’ Jayawardena points out that ‘the reasons [to the ethnic and religious conflict] are embedded in history, the political process and the ideology of religion and nationalism’. This essay tries to explore the discourse on how Buddhism as a collective and a public religion has contributed to the ethnic conflict from a historical perspective, especially with regard to the emergence of ‘Militant Buddhism’. The author has made an effort to go beyond the image of the militant monk found in much-quoted scholarly work on the subject to discover the more recent phenomenon of Buddhist monks in electoral politics.
Before turning to Buddhism, a more general view of the background to the ethnic rift should be spelt out, since the author believes that ignoring the context in general leads to placing overemphasis on certain issues. Orjuela claims that ‘[a] conflict over power and resources has resulted in a deep social divide, [where] ethno-mobilisation plays a central role and civilians are increasingly the perpetrators and the victims of violence’. Thus it must be stressed that power and resources and not religion lies at the roots of the conflict. She argues that the postcolonial democratic system reinforced the identity politics introduced during the British rule, leading to the development of two nationalisms within one state. De Silva contends that the model of parliamentary democracy – too simplistic for a population of ethnic diversity - concentrated power in the hands of a postcolonial elite who perpetuated the colonial stratagem of divide and rule to gain advantage of electoral politics. The author attributes the rise of mass nationalism among the Sinhalese as a reaction, not only towards the British, but towards this English educated power-elite that continued hegemonic tendencies into post independence era as well. One aspect of decolonisation was seen as a renewal of country’s religio-cultural traditions. A second aspect of decolonisation involved the relative positions and the sharing of power among the various ethnic groups. The major political parties played upon both these aspects to mobilize mass support and the demands of Sinhala Buddhist majority became the dominant cultural identity. This ‘Sinhalesation’ of the state essentially prompted minority Tamil nationalism. The Sinhala nationalist ideology holds that territorial integrity and prevalence of the majority rule as necessary to preserve the Sinhala Buddhist identity where as the Tamil nationalist ideology claims the Tamil nation’s right to self determination in what it defines as the Tamil homeland in the North and East of the island.
History and Religious Ideology
The 2500 years of Buddhist civilisation recounted in Pali chronicles are constantly reinterpreted and reinvented in postcolonial nationalist discourse. Amunugama writes that according to Sinhala-Buddhist tradition, fashioned largely by Vamsa literature, Sri Lanka is the Dharmadvipa (the island of faith), consecrated by the Buddha himself as the land in which his teachings would flourish. The myth of origin in Mahavamsa, a 6th century chronicle written by Buddhist monk-scholar, states that on the very day of the Buddha’s death, Vijaya-the founder of the Sinhala race - landed in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it was believed that the Buddha had visited the island thrice. One of those visits was to Nagadipa in the northernmost part of the Jaffna peninsula. (Ironically, to establish concord between two quarrelling kinsmen.) The north was thereby firmly established within the sacred geography of Buddhists. Till the beginning of the ethnic war Nagadipa was an important pilgrimage center for Sinhala Buddhists on a par with Mahiyangana and Kelaniya.
Rogers argues that during the Kandyan era being Buddhist was more important in claiming the throne than being Sinhalese. All Kandyan kings were expected to fulfil the role of the Buddhist king, but the longevity of the Nayakkar dynasty indicates no requirement of being Sinhalese. An important strain of royal ideology, which dates back to at least first century AD, posited a strong relationship between the king and Theravada Buddhism, especially the monkhood. According to Kapferer the defeat of the Kandyan Kingdom in 1815 ended the ruling chapters of Asgiri and Malwatta Buddhist monkhood, severing the connection between the Sangha and the state. The Buddhist revitalisation movements were integral to the reinvention of Sinhala Buddhist culture during the independence struggle. Kapferer argues that this revivalism tried to re-establish the old status quo of the affiliation of Buddhism to state. Though it had place for minorities, the Buddhist idea of co-existence, according to Kapferer, was by placing the minorities of the island in a subordinate role:
In Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist cosmology the nation and the state compose a unity. In cosmological conception the state protectively encloses the nation of Sinhalese Buddhists, whose integrity as persons is dependent on this encompassment. The state in such a conception encloses other peoples or nations who are not Sinhalese Buddhists. But critical here is that these peoples are maintained in hierarchical subordination to Sinhalese Buddhists. The encompassing and ordering power of the state is hierarchical, and the integrity of nations, peoples, and persons within the Sinhalese Buddhist state is dependent on the capacity of the state to maintain by the exercise of its power the hierarchical interrelation of all those it encloses. The failure in the power of the Sinhalese Buddhist state to maintain hierarchy in the whole order circumscribes threatens the integrity of persons. Thus the fragmentation of the state is also the fragmentation of the nation and is also the fragmentation of the person (Kapferer, 1988:7).
Buddhist Revivalism and Monastic Involvement in Politics
Tambiah claims that the Buddhist revivalism was a reaction against the betrayal of Buddhism during the British Raj and the restoration of Buddhism became an integral part of national freedom. Further, he argues that Buddhist-nationalist journalism propagated by key figures involved in the Buddhist revival like Anagarika Dharmapala fuelled communalism, culminating in the anti Muslim riot of 1915. Thus, what started off as a reaction against Christianity, Western habits of eating meat and alcoholism during the late 19th century was transformed into an ideology that alienated the minorities of the island during the 20th century.
In the struggle for Independence the role of the Buddhist monk as political and social activist was brought to attention, especially with the publication of Walapola Rahula’s The Heritage of the Bikkhu in 1946. Tambiah explains how during the very first general election in 1947 a group of radical monks became politically active in support of the leftist parties. He attributes the narrowing of Sri Lankan politics to a limited range of issues ‘framed within the confines of a Sinhala Buddhist nationalism’ to the emergence of these ‘militant monks’, during the early years of nation-building and state formation. However, he admits that monks were not involved in the riots of 1983, or in the events that preceded it. Nevertheless, he argues that proliferating ‘militantly Buddhist organisations’ during 1980s with a focus on the Sinhala Tamil ethnic conflict such as Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV), were instrumental in swaying public opinion against the ‘dangers of devolutionary solutions’ to the conflict, which was interpreted as the first step towards a Tamil Eelam.
Amunugama argues that the decision of Tamil youth to take to violence in their struggle for a separate state, the induction of Indian troops to the island, and the decision of the JVP to use ‘revolutionary violence’ created dilemmas-of varying degree-for Sinhala monks. With the exception of a minority of monks living in borderland of war or working with peace movements the majority of monks supported the Sri Lankan army curbing the Tamil rebels, seeking legitimacy through the distinction between violent Tamil guerillas and nonviolent Tamil civilians. According to Amunugama the Buddhist monks were encouraged to support the violence against Tamil rebels for the very fact that they were direct targets of rebel attacks. The rebels singled out monks for punishment: temples in North and East were attacked and busload of monks were massacred in Arantalawa in the late 1980s. 100 worshippers at the sacred Bo tree in Anuradhapura were killed and the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Kandy was attacked. The characterization of the Tamil rebels as savage helped the monastic order to support and extend their patronage to the Sri Lankan military forces. Amunugama writes:
Military commanders, after assuming office, worshipped at the Temple of the Tooth and met the Mahanayakes of Asgiriya and Malwatta to obtain their blessings. Bodhi Pujas were held in leading temples to seek the blessings of gods in ensuring the safety and success of military personnel. Monks officiated at military functions and the central army cantonment at Panagoda saw the erection of an impressive ‘chaitya’ (pagoda). (Amunugama 1991: 129)
Indo-Lanka Peace Accord
According to the Indo Lanka agreement in 1987 the Sri Lankan authorities agreed to effect changes in the country’s constitution and devolve substantial power from the center to the provinces. Eight Provincial Councils were to be established; one of which - the council of the amalgamated North and Eastern provinces - would be Tamil dominated. This would, in effect grant a degree of autonomy- to the Tamils in what they claimed were their ‘traditional homelands’. On this note, India deployed its army, said to be around 55,000 in strength to pacify the Northern reaches of the island, and in turn released the Sri Lankan army sent to confront the JVP struggle in the South. The devolutionary solution was strongly opposed by the JVP and young monks. An agreement between the two governments in an exchange of letters that neither the port of Trincomalee nor any other part of the island will be made “available for military use by any other country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests” confirmed fears of Indian imperialism among Sri Lankans and created an unprecedented uproar.
Amunugama and Tambiah both claim that religious ideologues such as Maduluwawe Sobhitha have played a pivotal role in resisting IPKF involvement in the conflict, by influencing public opinion. This was not unconnected to the young monks’ involvement with the JVP and its armed struggle. In fact, the 1980s saw the rapid politicization of the Sangha with all Sinhala political parties establishing support organizations among the Sangha. The extreme of this logic was that JVP recruited the monks as another foot soldier in its struggle. This brought the Buddhist order face to face with violence. The most illustrative example of this phenomenon comes from May Day Parade in 1982 when a thousand young monks ‘clad in their distinctive saffron red robes walked under the banner of the socialist Bhikku front.
JVP’s Warrior-Monk
Tambiah questions: how did the ‘sons of Buddha – ideally dedicated to nonviolence and required by disciplinary rules to abstain from killing and to be nowhere near marching armies and traffic in arms – have taken on the more compelling identity of the ‘sons of the soil’, which entails militant and violent politics? An answer can be found in the JVP movement of the 1970s and 80, which was the most systematic and successful in mobilizing monks as an essential militant support group. Drawing its membership from young rural proletariat, educated yet unemployed due to Sri Lanka’s benign social policies and poor economic growth, the movement infiltrated universities, where young monks constituted an increasingly significant segment. The egalitarian populist ideology, spiced with anti-Tamil pro-Sinhala and pseudo-Buddhist elements appealed to these young monks, who have been fighting hierarchy, sectarianism and casteism within their own monastic orders vis-à-vis national revival for the past half-century. Drawing from A.C. Alles, Tambiah and Amunugama mention that the decision to launch the attack on government in 1971 was taken in a Bhikku hostel in a university and that during both 1971 and 1987 rebellions some Buddhist temples in rural areas were used as storages for arms and ammunition, hiding places and outposts by the insurgents. Amunugama claims that during the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord the polarization of JVP and other mainstream parties into two camps was reflected in the monastic order with senior monks favoring the pro-accord stance of the main political parties, resulting in the assassination of these monks, allegedly by the JVP. The brutal repression of the insurgency made the JVP monks the most vulnerable segment of the movement, unable to hide underground following its militant leaders. Though the author has not located actual data, it is common knowledge that many young monks were tortured and killed by paramilitary forces. Amunugama explains how poetry corners and short story pages in newspapers were filled up with this dilemma of the young monks, who on the face of state terror had to change loyalties, flee the country or as in the finale of many stories, shed the saffron robe and take to a T-56 submachine gun, and disappear into the night.
JHU’s Politician Monk
Much has changed since Tambiah’s controversial book and Amunugama’s poignant essay published in early 1990s. In 2004, nine Buddhist monks were elected to the parliament, creating history in Theravada Buddhist Monasticism in South and South East Asia. Jatika Hela Urumaya was the first such monastic political party to take part in electoral politics with over 200 Buddhist monk candidates standing for the parliamentary elections of in April 2004. Though the event caused much debate among the lay public JHU were able to secure 5.9% of the total votes polled. Deegalle attributes this quick victory to JHU’s roots to Sihala Urumaya, another nationalist political party suffering an electoral setback, and the general socio-religious context of the country. JHU was able to capitalize on the untimely death of Gangodavila Soma, a charismatic popular monk who had immense influence on public opinion. Sri Lankan newspapers characterize Soma as ‘quite identical’ to the early twentieth-century Buddhist reformer, Anagarika Dharmapala,. Through the use of mass media such as television talk shows a number of monks were criticizing state corruption and issues of ethnic conflict, through the Buddhist rhetoric of ‘Dharmaraajya’ (a righteous state).
The JHU manifesto claims Buddhist supremacy and upholds the preservation of Buddhism and sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka as the priority of the state. They have been active in passing a bill for banning forceful conversion of Hindus and Buddhists into Christianity. JHU has been widely criticized not only by international organizations but by local media as well for Sinhalese Chauvinism, which proves that JHU Sinhala Buddhist nationalism is a small yet forceful minority political opinion. Top prelates and sections of the media have objected to the monks being directly involved in politics. A Sunday Times editorial, for instance, meekly commented: “The Kings of Lanka would constantly seek the advice of the monks in order that they guide the destinies of their people righteously: And that is the way that ought to be today. Nowhere is it said that a monk should be the king himself.” Interestingly this comment highlights that the lay Buddhists acknowledge the role of the monk as guide though it condemns active participation of monks in politics.
These recent developments show that despite the infamous involvement with the JVP during the previous two decades, the Buddhist monks have become a political group wielding public opinion. In return for JHU backing, President Rajapakse agreed to JHU demands during his presidential election campaign for a more aggressive stance against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The 12-point agreement included the revision of the current government-LTTE ceasefire; the abrogation of a government-LTTE agreement for the joint administration of tsunami aid; and the rejection of federalism as the basis for a peace deal with the LTTE.
Guns and Robes
An essay ‘Non-violent Buddhist Problem Solving in Sri Lanka’ by A T Ariyaratna, founder of the Sarvodaya movement, describes the predicament of the Buddhist laity in grasping the paradox of violence in a country idolising the Buddhist values of Ahimsa, and especially among the monastic order:
Statistically seventy percent of the people in Sri Lanka are said to profess Buddhism. There is hardly any place in the country where an ancient or modern Buddhist monument or monastery in not found. There are around twenty thousand monks attending to the religious needs of people today. Religious ceremonies and related activities are going on continuously. The teachings of the Buddha in its most pristine form is found in Dhamma texts. Even non- Buddhist laymen and politicians liberally quote chapter and verse from the Buddha's Words in their public utterances. When one sees and hears this, one gets the impression, or I would say, the illusion, that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country. To my mind, to call Sri Lanka a Buddhist country and then to put the blame for every kind of immoral act or incident of violence or denial of human rights on Buddhists is not fair. Even though historically and culturally Sri Lanka may claim to be Buddhist, in my opinion, certainly the way political and economic structures are instituted and managed today can hardly be called Buddhist either in precept or practice. (Ariyaratne 2006, unpublished/ personal communication)
Similarly as a Sri Lankan, the author often found it difficult to relate some of parts the scholastic writings to the public realities experienced. Terms like ‘Militant Buddhism’ have been used carelessly by the media, and more obvious common-sense answers lost in esoteric academic debate. Tambiah, one of the main sources quoted in this essay, often draws from other sources openly propagandist in nature. Ariyratne on the same note:
…a negative kind of intervention on the part of some educated people, interventions in the form of scholarly analyses based on a hoard of statistical data and historical facts. I call this mostly negative intervention because they did not affect in any way the thinking of either the man on the street or our basic political and economic structure that promoted the situation of disharmony and conflict. In other words, philosophising that does not touch the basic roots of mental defilements and social realities resulting from them, in Buddhist terminology, is simply called moha or ignorance. When ignorance becomes organised, and one calls it social science, it is a disaster for communities who have a right to expect more positive interventions from the more educated sectors. We see a situation today in Sri Lanka of different groups holding onto their own uncompromising positions while the sound of guns and explosions continue to be heard. (Ariyaratne 2006, unpublished/ personal communication)
Conclusion
An attempt was made to illustrate briefly the matrix of history religion and ethno-politics in Sri Lanka’s decades-long conflict with special focus on the role played by Buddhist monks. As a majority with a minority complex derived, (as claimed by many scholarly anthropologists), from centuries of paranoia of Indian invasions and conspiracy theories from which the island - as the last resort of Buddhism - has to be saved, one could readily simplify the case of Sri Lanka as religious fundamentalism. However, the politicisation and militancy of the monks is but one thread that contributes to weave a complex social fabric of conflict and chaos. Failure to provide economic and political opportunities to educated alienated youth (both Sinhala and Tamil) resulting in social frustration is perhaps more fundamental to JVP and LTTE militant struggles than the ‘burden of historical memories’ of ancient kingdoms. Furthermore, it is essential to understand the militant monk as a part of a society completely wreaked by power struggles resorting to violence in all sides – LTTE in the north, JVP in the south the state in countering and repressing these struggles and the induction of the Indian troops within the island, to top it all. The young monks had had to react and find justifications for prioritising the task of saving the motherland over passive preaching of Dharma.
As Amunugama argues, it is also difficult to view the monastic order as a monolithic organisation that had clear-cut vision on ethnic and political issues.
Most importantly he points out the attempts of Sinhala monks to understand social reality in terms of Buddhist symbolism. When dealing with secular notions like ethnicity, democracy, revolution and violence, monks attempted to relate them to their culturally prescribed world of symbols. They go back to the examples of the monks who confronted British power during the struggle for independence. Communism is understood in terms of the Buddha’s prescription of communal living (absence of private property, sharing of alms, etc.) for the monastic order. This leads to the continuous ‘oversimplification’ of complex contemporary issues.
As a final note, the exploration of this discourse may lead one to question the absence of a dialogue on secularism in Sri Lanka, which was present in India in its nationalist discourse.
Bibliography
Ariyaratna, A T, (2006) Non-violent Buddhist Problem Solving in Sri Lanka, unpublished/ personal communication
Deegalle Mahinda (2004) Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and Ethnicity in Contemporary Sri Lanka, Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 5, No. 2
De Silva, Purnaka L (1997) Sri Lanka: Futures beyond Conlict, Futures vol29 issue 10
Dias Wije, 2005, Sri Lanka: the JHU-Rajapakse deal and the reactionary role of Buddhist Supremacism, World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org
Kapferer, Bruce (2001), Ethnic Nationalism and Discourses on violence in Sri Lanka, Communal/Plural Vol 9 no 1
Orjuela, Camilla (2004) Civil Society in Civil War: Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka, PhD Dissertation, Göteborg University
Panini Wijesiriwardana and K. Ratnayake 1, April, 2004: New Sinhala extremist party fields Buddhist monks in Sri Lankan elections, World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org
Rogers, John D (1994), Post Orientalism and Interpretation of Pre-modern and Modern Political Identities, Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 53, No 1, Pages 10-23, Association of Asian Studies
Tambiah, Stanley J (1992), Buddhism Betrayed: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka, University of Chicago Press
Uyangoda J Brass, Paul R & Vanaik, Achin Competing Nationalisms in South Asia
Hasini Apsara Haputhanthri
MA in Asian Studies
Centre for East and Southeast Asian Sudies
Lund Unversity
Sweden
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